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INTRODUCTION

The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)' and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (SEA) 2 were enacted to protect investors and the general public
from fraud and to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealings in
the offering and selling of securities. 3 While Congress passed this legislation
as a consequence of the 1929 Stock Market Crash and of prevalent abuses
of the securities industry, 4 both Acts, together with several other pieces of

* Editor's Note: This comment was selected as the Best Comment for Fall 1997.
** I dedicate this comment to my parents, Gilberto and Gladys Ferri, whose love,

support, and guidance have helped me to achieve my goals.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1994).
2. Id. §§ 78a-7811.
3. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-97 (1976) (addressing the
congressional intent to protect both the general public and the individual investor). Cf. Central
Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994) (stating that "the Acts 'embrace a
fundamental purpose ... to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor' ") (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,151 (1972)).
This is significant because while a line of cases up through the 1970s stated that the
fundamental purpose of the Acts was full disclosure, the cases of the last two decades have
restated the philosophy of caveat emptor as addressed in Central Bank.
4. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 170-71 (reflecting on the motives of Congress at the
time the legislation was passed).
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related legislation,5 continue to have a strong impact on today's investment
industry. Congress has made relatively few amendments to these Acts, 6 and
consequently, they are impeding U.S. investors as the world continues to
move toward globalization.
This comment examines the dramatic increase in global trade and
investment, particularly in emerging markets, and the reasons behind the
This
increased desire of U.S. investors to invest in foreign securities.
comment also addresses how the stringent requirements of this legislation
restrict access to capital, to the detriment of emerging markets and U.S.
investors. It shows that while it is both important and appropriate to
maintain securities regulations in order to insure the integrity of U.S.
markets, it is equally important to amend these regulations in order to
advance the U.S. and global economies and to help maintain the competitive
position of the United States in the global capital market.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

Overview of Securities Legislation

"The [U.S.] government has assumed a regulatory role over the issuance
and sale of securities to assure the public is adequately informed and not
subject to fraudulent actions." 7 The central pieces of legislation in this area
are the Securities Act and the SEA. The Securities Act aims to protect
investors from fraud in the initial distribution of securities, while the SEA
aims to protect investors from fraud in secondary transactions.8 Both Acts
were "a small part of the social legislation of the 1930s, but [today they] play
a major role in the [trading] of securities and securities transactions." 9
The Securities Act pertains to public offerings and their registration with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) unless an exemption is

5. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a to 79z-6; the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb; the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64; the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1
to 80b-21; the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. §§ 661-697F; the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111;and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422. These acts govern specific areas not covered in the
Securities Act or the SEA.
6. Private Resale of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1997) [hereinafter
Rule 144A]. Rule 144A contains two safe harbor exemptions from registration of securities
under the Securities or the SEA, assuming the offering is exclusively outside of the United
States and that all other qualifications provided for have been met. Id.
7. RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSAC-

903 (1995).
8. Id. at 904-05.
9. Id. at 904.

TIONS
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applicable. " The Act prohibits not only the "[sale] or deliver[y of]
unregistered securities through the use of the mails,"" but also even an
offer to sell or an offer to buy an unregistered security. 12 The registration
requirement is not an approval process so much as it is a disclosure process.
"The federal theory is not to approve or disapprove, but to inform the public
and allow the public to make its own choice."' 13 Registration with the SEC
involves not only paying fees 14 and completing exhaustive forms, but also
disclosing what is sometimes seen as "sensitive information" in other
cultures.'" As part of the registration process, the legislation also requires
that issuers either prepare their financial disclosure in accordance with U.S.
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or reconcile them with U.S.
GAAP. 16 This last requirement is the subject of much controversy in the
area of securities 17regulations reform with critics from both sides offering
viable arguments.

10. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
11. Id. § 77e(a).
12. Id. § 77e(c). Note that the terms "sell" and "offer to sell" are defined very broadly
under § 77b(3) to include virtually any kind of contact, solicitation, or offer to dispose. Id.
§ 77b(3).
13. FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 7, at 904.
14. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77f(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (stating that "[t]he rate determined...
is a rate equal to $200 per $1,000,000 of the maximum aggregate price at which such
securities are proposed to be offered").
15. William E. Decker, The Attractions of the U.S. Securities Markets to Foreign Issuers
and the Alternative Methods of Accessing the U.S. Markets: From the Issuer's Perspective,
17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S10, S18-19 (1994) (discussing the concerns of foreign issuers about
the sensitivity of the required information).
16. 17 C.F.R. 210.4-01(a)(2) (1997) (Regulations S-X). This section states:
In all filings of private foreign issuers . . . the financial statements may be
prepared according to a comprehensive body of accounting principles other than
those generally accepted in the United States if a reconciliation to United States
generally accepted accounting principles and the provisions of Regulation S-X . .
. is also filed as part of the financial statements. Alternatively, the financial
statements may be prepared according to United States generally accepted
accounting principles.
Id.
17. Compare Pat McConnell, Practical Company Experience in Entering U.S. Markets:
SignificantIssues and Hurdlesfrom the Advisor's Perspective, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S 120,
S121-22 (1994) (arguing that conformity to U.S. GAAP is not an obstacle to foreign issuers,
but rather is helpful because the U.S. GAAP requirements, particularly the footnote disclosure
requirements, provide relevant information for investors and thus. provides an efficient and
liquid market from which to raise capital), with James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory
Requirements for Foreign Firms Appropriate?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S58, S61-67 (1994)
(arguing that U.S. GAAP requirements for the registration of foreign securities have kept a
large number of foreign investors away and that some reconciliation should be reached). For
further information, see infra text accompanying notes 41-74.
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The SEA applies to the resale of securities on the secondary market.' 8
Its aim is different from that of the Securities Act in terms of its focus on
secondary over primary distribution and its emphasis on disclosure rather
than on registration. 19 "The disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act are not
a one time process, but a mandate for continued filing of information about
the company." 20 While both Acts have the goal of informing and protecting
the investor at the heart of their existence, bringing suit under one Act does
not preclude remedy under the other. 21 Foreign companies must comply
with the SEA if they have a registered security trading in the United States
or want to list an already existing stock.22
In the 1930s, securities transactions were predominantly domestic in
nature, 23 and Congress did not consider the form of the international
transactions that the courts would encounter decades later.24 "A dramatic
globalization trend, however, is presently transforming the nature of securities
markets and the nature of transactions conducted in those markets., 25 In an
attempt to acknowledge and accommodate the increase in foreign companies
wishing to trade in the United States, the SEC recently enacted legislation to
ease the burden of registration and disclosure.2 6 The SEC's enactment in

18. First Nat'l City Bank v. Smith, 531 P.2d 321, 324 (Okla. 1975) (explaining that the
SEA, not the Securities Act, governs the transfer of securities subsequent to the initial
offering).
19. FOLsOM & GORDON, supra note 7, at 905 (explaining the purpose and function of the
SEA).
20. Id.
21. Rotstein v. Reynolds & Co., 359 F. Supp. 109, 111-12 (N.D. Ill. 1973). The court
held that remedies afforded by the Securities Act and the SEA are not mutually exclusive but
are cumulative. Id. Where a given act or activity gives rise to civil action by a person
wronged thereby under more than one provision of the Acts and where one such potential
action is subject to a limitation period that is the shorter than that of other potential action,
the fact that shorter limitation period has expired does not preclude the injured party from
bringing the action that is subject to longer limitation period. Id.
22. Nicholas G. Demmo, Comment, U.S. SecuritiesRegulation: The Needfor Modification
to Keep Pace with Globalization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 691, 701 (1996).
23. Kellye E. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global
Marketplace, 45 ALA. L. REV. 927, 928 (1994).
Propelled by advancing technology, global linkages are increasingly being forged
and significant transnational movements of capital have become the norm rather than
the exception. In a shrinking world featuring a growing number of emerging market
economies, this trend is not likely to abate. Given the sharp upswing in complex
transnational transactions, it is merely a matter of time before courts are faced with
more frequent and more difficult decisions as to the scope of the antifraud protections of the U.S. securities laws.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
24. FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 7, at 907.
25. Testy, supra note 23, at 928.
26. Richard Kosnik, Panel II: The Role of the SEC in EvaluatingForeign Issuers Coming
to U.S. Markets, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S97, S98-S99 (1994) (discussing the implementation
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1990 of Regulation S,17 providing greater certainty about registration
requirements for offshore offerings, the adoption of Rule 144A,28 providing
for greater ease when conducting a private placement of securities in the
United States, 29 and the acceptance of International Accounting Standard
(lAS) No. 730 illustrate an attempt by the SEC to insure that U.S. securities
laws do not prevent U.S. investors from investing in foreign securities. The
enactment of these amendments was a step in the right direction toward
global access to liquid capital and in theory, enhances the access of U.S.
investors to profitable offshore opportunities. 321
However, these
"improvements" have had a limited practical effect.
B.

Investor Interest in Foreign Securities

The U.S. investor's interest in foreign investment opportunities has
blossomed.33 A paradigmatic explanation for this phenomenon is that
"when [U.S. investors] look abroad for places to invest their money, [they]
no longer see the 'great unknown' with the typical American parochialism
that we used to find."' 34 This trend is likely to continue as information
becomes more easily accessible through sources, such as the Internet, that
were not available until recently. Another reason for this growing popularity
is that international stocks can reduce the risk of an investor's portfolio.
Since the 1950s, the basic portfolio theory has held that the risk
of a portfolio of securities is less than the risk of the individual
securities constituting the portfolio. Adding foreign securities to a

of Rule 144A, Regulation S,and the multijurisdictional disclosure system with Canada and
how they are evidence of the conceptual approaches to regulating the market that the SEC
now employs).
27. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1997).
28. Id. § 230.144A.
29. Decker, supra note 15, at S 14-S 15 (explaining Rule 144A in the context of the SEC's
intention of improving access to U.S. markets for foreign issuers).
30. Cochrane, supra note 17, at S65 (discussing the implications of the SEC's acceptance
of LAS No. 7). The implications of the IAS as applied to regulation of the U.S. securities
market is beyond the scope of this comment.
31. FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 7, at 909-10.
32. Id. Rule 144A was "intended to encourage foreign issuers to raise capital in the
United States . .. and to liberalize the privately placed securities market" by creating a new
market with limited disclosure. Id. at 912. However, critics argue that the definition of
"'qualified institutional buyer' is too narrow." Id. at 913; 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (a)
(definition in Rule 144A). They further state that under this definition, only the largest
institutional investors can utilize Rule 144A, and this effectively prevents foreign issuers from
selling to smaller institutions and individuals. Id.
33. Steven Davis, The Allure of ADRs, INsTrruTIoNAL INv., Sept. 1994, at 109.
34. James R. Silkenat, Panel I: Overview of U.S. SecuritiesMarkets and Foreign Issuers,
17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S4, S7 (1994).
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portfolio can reduce the risk even further because the returns of
foreign securities have a relatively low correlation with the returns
of U.S. Securities.35
But perhaps the most important explanation for this increase in U.S. investor
interest is that many foreign securities are outperforming the U.S. markets,
in spite of the overwhelming success of U.S. markets in recent years. a6
This is particularly evident in the emerging markets in Latin America.37
The most evident example of U.S. interest in foreign stocks is activity in
the American Depository Receipt (ADR) market.38 ADRs are the most
common means by which U.S. investor's trade foreign equity securities.39
Since they are more liquid, less expensive, and easier to trade than foreign
stocks, ADRs have become more popular. 4° The rules for investing directly
overseas are "archaic, complex, and inconvenient," and the transaction costs
are higher.'
While ADRs and foreign stocks listed on U.S. exchanges
provide many opportunities for U.S. investors to invest in foreign securities,
the current regulatory scheme still significantly limits them.

35. Demmo, supra note 22, at 696 (footnotes omitted); see also William Glasgall & Dave
Lindorff, The Global Investor, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 19, 1994, at 96, 97-98 (noting that the
Nikkei average and the markets of Malaysia, Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland have shown a
very low correlation with the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index (S&P 500), upon
examination of data from Morningstar, Inc., a financial research house).
36. Davis, supra note 33, at 110.
37. Welt Research Group, Latin American Index (1997) (South Florida-based market
analysis firm) (on file with author). The year-to-date rates of return in real, U.S. dollar terms,
are higher for seven Latin American countries than for the Dow Jones Industrial Average
(DJIA). Id. An analysis in real, U.S. dollar terms is defined as the returns in the market
factored against the currency fluctuations of the starting and ending dates of the period. The
DJIA's rate of return from 12/31/96 through 10/13/97 is 25.2%. Id. This means that
US$1000 invested on 12/31/96 into a portfolio of DJIA companies would have yielded a profit
of US$252 on 10/13/97. The rates of return of the seven Latin American countries are as
follows: Argentina, 34.1%; Brazil, 70.7%; Chile, 27.4%; Columbia, 42.9%; Mexico, 58.8%;
Peru, 36.8%; and Venezuela, 48.6%. Id.
38. Davis, supra note 33, at 110. "An ADR is a receipt representing shares on deposit
with and registered in the name of a bank, usually in the home nation of the foreign
company." FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 7, at 914. There are still some registration and
disclosure requirements that must be listed on the ADR market, but they are not as stringent
as those for a public listing. Id. For a more detailed discussion on ADRs, see id. at 913-14.
39. Glasgall & Lindorff, supra note 35, at 97.
40. Id.
41. Demmo, supra note 22, at 698. The U.S. investor can purchase directly overseas in
two ways: (1) "open a foreign bank account, pay large brokerage commissions, high foreign
exchange charges, and sizable local taxes," or (2) use a U.S. broker. However, U.S. brokers
typically charge high fees and require a minimum US$25,000 order. Id.
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I.

A.

ANALYSIS

The Status Quo

Proponents of current securities legislation argue that ample opportunities
exist for investment in foreign securities2 These proponents point to the
record number of foreign securities offerings, particularly after the implementation of Rule 144A,43 as proof that the SEC has loosened its securities
regulations enough in order to insure adequate access to foreign companies.
Supporters argue that over the last eight years the SEC has been more
"issuer-friendly" in accommodating foreign issuers. 44 For example, in 1993,
the SEC reduced the public-float requirement for foreign companies
conducting offerings from US$300 million to US$75 million.45 Proponents
also point out the SEC has been very flexible with regard to historical data
missing from footnote disclosures in the financial records of foreign
companies attempting to conform to U.S. GAAP.46
The primary argument against easing the regulations on issuers of foreign
securities to be traded in the United States is that the integrity of the U.S.
market must be adequately protected to prevent fraud and maintain the high
investor confidence that the U.S. market currently enjoys. 7 Proponents
correctly point out that high investor confidence makes the U.S. markets
large and liquid, thereby attracting foreign issuers. The reasoning behind
maintaining high disclosure and reporting requirements is:
if these
requirements were lowered, there would be a greater risk of fraud, in turn,
resulting in lower investor confidence and a higher cost of capital, which

42. Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a Time of
Economic Transformation, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S77, S82-S83 (1994); Decker, supra note

15, at Sll-S13; McConnell, supra note 17, at S122, S125.
43. Kosnik, supra note 26, at S99. Kosnik notes that in the three years following the
passage of Rule 144A, there was an eight-fold increase in foreign securities offered under
Rule 144A, from US$3.4 billion in 1990 to US$24 billion in 1993. Id. He further notes that
there was a decline in the use of Rule 144A for offerings of equity securities to foreign
issuers, but attributes this to a shift by foreign companies from Rule 144A private offerings
to straight public offerings with full registration and disclosure. Id. at S100.
44. Id. at $98-S99; see Decker, supra note 15, at S22-$23.
45. Davis, supra note 33, at 112.46. McConnell, supra note 17, at S127. The SEC's cooperative attitude is illustrated by
its dealings with Daimler-Benz when it decided to conform to U.S. GAAP requirements. Id.
at S125-26. The Chief Financial Officer of Daimler-Benz stated that "some of the difference
between [US and German] accounting systems were not [as] striking as they were perceived
to be." Id. (quoting Dr. Gerhard Liener).
47. Breeden, supra note 42, at S81-S82 (explaining that a protected market raises investor
confidence because the risk to exposure is lower, and that with lower risk, capital flows in
more readily, lowering its cost).
48. See id. at S82-S85.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

7

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 18

[Vol. I11

would affect even "honest" companies.4 9 Finally, status quo proponents
argue that easing the reporting requirements for foreign issuers, particularly
regarding adherence to U.S. GAAP, is inherently unfair to U.S. companies
and would create a registration advantage for foreign issuers that would be
a detriment to domestic issuers. 50
B.

Changes Proposed by Others

The overwhelming reasoning behind proposed changes in current
securities legislation to a less stringent level is that they would provide more
opportunities to U.S. investors and maintain the position of the United States
as the most attractive market in which to raise capital.5' Until recently, the
52
U.S. Securities markets did not face any significant competition.
Therefore, the SEC could require high levels of disclosure and reporting
without jeopardizing competitiveness of U.S. markets.53 However, as
foreign exchanges continue to improve their regulation to a level where
investors are no longer exposed to high levels of fraud and risk, 54 many
potential issuers and investors will participate in foreign markets to maximize
their returns, especially where these markets provide higher average rates of
return than the highly regulated markets.55
A basic economic maxim of investing is that an investor should analyze
the potential returns of a given security and weigh them against the risk in
obtaining that return.5 6 The greater the disclosure and protection from
fraud, the less the risk. Therefore, the U.S. market, which has the world's
most stringent disclosure requirements and highest levels of protection, is a

49. See id. at S82.
50. Id. at S88. But see Cochrane, supra note 17, at S61-S63 (arguing that whereas U.S.
companies already use U.S. GAAP, not requiring foreign companies to play catch up is not
inherently unfair and pointing out that U.S. issuers are not required to adhere to local
exchange rules abroad).
51. Cochrane, supra note 17, at S58-S60 (discussing the concern that as foreign markets
become less risky, U.S. investors will take their money elsewhere).
52. Joseph A. Grundfest, Zen and the Art of Securities Regulation, in MODERNIZING U.S.
SECURITIES REGULATIONS: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 4 (Kenneth Lehn &
Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992) (noting that historically no substitute markets have
existed at a reasonable cost) [hereinafter MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATIONS].
53. Id.
54. FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 7, at 907 (explaining that many foreign governments
are "catching up" to U.S. regulation in an attempt to improve their own markets, thereby
making them more attractive).
55. James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of International

Regulatory Competition, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 159-160 (1992) (explaining that
the main barrier, besides regulation, to investing in offshore securities is that the risk of fraud
in some markets is still too great).
56. See id.
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relatively low-risk market, making it attractive to investors.57 From the
issuer's perspective, the cost, both financial and in terms of undesired
disclosure, should be weighed against the liquidity and volume of a
market.58 Although, the United States has the largest and most liquid
market in the world, which makes it very attractive to issuers worldwide, 9
it also has the world's most burdensome and costly registration requirements,
which prevents many companies from entering the U.S. market. 6
All things being equal, the U.S. market would be the world's most
attractive market because of the relatively low risk associated with dealing
in it.6 . However, all things are not equal. As foreign securities, particularly
those in emerging markets, continue to provide astronomical rates of return,
the benefits of higher-returning foreign securities will outweigh the risk
incurred with less than full disclosure, thereby making them a more profitable
alternative to the U.S. market. 62 This will naturally drive capital outside the
United States and eventually weaken the U.S. market, making it less
appealing to both investors and issuers.63 Additionally, as foreign markets
improve their safeguards, 64 the amount of risk will approach tolerable levels,
particularly in light of the higher rates of returns that many foreign markets
are showing. 65 While many foreign markets are regarded as under-

57. See generally id. at 158-64.
58. Demmo, supra note 22, at 707.
59. See Silkenat, supra note 34, at $4-$8 (explaining that a market that is attractive to an
issuer is one that has many potential investors and where transactions can occur quickly to
better reflect value).
60. Id. at S5.
61. See Cox, supra note 55, at 159-60.
62. The true measure of return is the rate-of-return in real dollar terms, discounted for
risk. See infra note 65 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the meaning of risk.
By analyzing the rates-of-return then factoring in a volatility correlation to account for risk,
market analysts arrive at a "risk-adjusted return" for different markets. This risk-adjusted
return is in the form of an index where the higher the number, the greater the risk-adjusted
or "true" return. The U.S. DJIA's risk-adjusted return (return is U.S. dollars divided by
adjusted volatility) for Jan. 1, 1997 to Oct. 13, 1997 is 2.65, while those of Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico are 3.31, 4.77, and 4.23, respectively. Welt Research Group, supra note 37; see
also Stephen Sjuggerud, Who's CorrelatedNow?, WORLD MARKET ANALYST, Nov. 1997, at
4, 5 (discussing risk-adjusted returns in more detail).
63. Cox, supra note 55, at 159-162 (explaining that the main goal of most investors is
profit, therefore they invest in markets where they can maximize their profits once they have
accounted for risk).
64. FOLsoM & GORDON, supra note 7, at 907.
65. Market volatility is an objective way to measure risk. Interview with Porter,
Stansberry, Welt Research (now Fleet Street), Delray Beach, Fla. The degree to which people
pull their money in and out of a given market is an objective way of ascertaining the risk in
that market. Id. To quantify volatility, analysts correlate the volatility of a foreign market
to the U.S. DJIA, with 100 being the DJIA level of stability; other markets are assigned a
percentage of the volatility of the DJIA for the same time period. Id. In the last five-year
period (1992-1997), the volatility correlations of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, Latin
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regulated, the U.S. market may be more regulated than prudent investors
require, unnecessarily keeping away issuers. At the current rate, foreign
stock markets will most likely find the ideal equilibrium between risk and
return sooner than the U.S. market, consequently weakening the dominant
position of the United States. 66
Many critics of existing legislation propose eliminating the U.S. GAAP
requirements for foreign issuers who want to list on U.S. exchanges, arguing
that adherence to U.S. GAAP is not requisite to a U.S. investor's decision of
where to invest. 67 The volume of investors who currently are purchasing
foreign stock, either directly or through the ADR market, supports this
argument.68 Proponents of this change argue that current SEC rules do not
protect investors, but force investors into less regulated, more expensive
markets. 69 Furthermore, in response to the argument that under Rule 144A
is an adequate vehicle for access to foreign securities, proponents for change
correctly point out that the only eligible buyers under Rule 144A are
institutional entities, such as mutual funds and pension funds, which again
raises transaction costs for the individual buyer.70 As a result, proponents
suggest three alternatives to the current regulatory scheme.
The first alternative is to allow certain foreign "world class" companies 71 to register on U.S. exchanges without requiring them to adhere to

America's biggest markets, were .41, .20, and .29, respectively. Sjuggerud, supra note 62,
at 5. However, in the last 30-month period ending with September 1997, the volatility
correlations for these same markets were .54, .42, and .51, respectively. Id. These numbers
show a trend of volatility, and therefore risk, approaching DJIA levels of stability. It is the
direction of the trend and not the raw numbers that is of importance. For current analysis
data, see Morgan Stanley Capital International, Correlation Analysis Data (visited July 20,
1998) <http://www.ms.com/msci/perform> (on file with author) (Morgan Stanley is the world's
largest financial analyst of foreign stock markets).
66. Cochrane, supra note 17, passim (suggesting that the level of disclosure required in
the United States is higher than the U.S. market demands).
67. Franklin R. Edwards, SEC Requirements for Trading of Foreign Securities on U.S.
Exchanges, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATIONS, supra note 52, at 57, 64-66

(explaining that U.S. GAAP disclosures themselves are not the determining factor in a
decision whether or not to invest and stating that investors do not discount the value of a
company that reports in a different system).
68. See discussion supra part H.
69. Edwards, supra note 67, at 64.
70. William J. Baumol & Burton G. Malkiel, Redundant Regulation of Foreign Security
Trading and U.S. Competitiveness, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATIONS, supra

note 52, at 39, 42-43 (noting that in foreign countries, investors face considerably higher
brokerage fees and are forced to pay higher bid-ask spreads, along with higher clearance,
settlement, and custody costs).
71. "World-class" companies are those companies with US$5 billion in revenues and
market capital of US$2 billion, or an average weekly trading volume of US$1 million or
200,000 shares and substantial foreign share ownership that are listed on at least one major
world market exchange in addition to their home country's exchanges. Cochrane, supra note
17, at S63; Edwards, supra note 67, at 59.
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U.S. GAAP, but requiring them to explain any differences between their
home country accounting standards and U.S. GAAp. 72 This proposal
essentially mirrors the waiver allowed to offerings made under Regulation
S73 and extends the same relaxed standard to offerings and listings on the
U.S. markets. Another proposed alternative, again focusing on accounting
standards, is to establish international accounting and disclosure standards,
such as those being written by the International Accounting Standards
Committee, which would put all of the world's securities on a level playing
field in terms of disclosure and reporting.74 While this is a good long-term
solution, it is too overwhelming a task to be accomplished in the foreseeable
future.7 5 A third alternative is to have bifurcated exchanges where, given
their level of sophistication, institutional investors could trade in exchangelisted foreign companies that do not fully comply with SEC regulatory
requirements.76 This last alternative is essentially a relaxed version of the
current 144A exception,77 however, it still fails to address the added
transactional costs imposed on individuals and small institutional buyers or
the limitation imposed on foreign issuers whose float is not large enough to
attract large institutional buyers.
All of these proposed alternatives are viable, but they fail to address the
plight of individuals or of small institutional buyers. Another shortcoming
is that these alternatives potentially threaten the integrity of the current U.S.
markets by lowering standards for -the listing of securities. 78e For these
reasons, the status quo is not likely to change dramatically until an
international accounting and disclosure system is in place, which is not likely
in the foreseeable future.
C.

Deregulation of Marketing Restrictions: A Temporary Solution

Up to this point, the focus of the securities regulation debate has been on
listings on the actual national exchanges, 79 and little attention has been paid
to the restriction on advertising of foreign securities. A happy median would
be to expose U.S. investors to more foreign securities opportunities through
controlled advertising without actually listing these securities on the U.S.

72. Cochrane, supra note 17, at S63 (proposing a compromise for the sake of cost benefit
without jeopardizing disclosure information).
73. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904.
74. Cochrane, supra note 17, at S65 (discussing the long-term ideal of having international
uniform securities regulation).
75. Id. at S65.
76. Id. S63-S64; Demmo, supra note 22, at 720.
77. Cochrane, supra note 17, at S64.
78. Breeden, supra note 42, at S84.
79. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and
the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ).
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exchanges. Specifically, the current regulatory scheme makes it not only
impossible to list or make an offering through one of the U.S. markets, but
also illegal for foreign issuers to advertise or contact U.S. investors without
first registering them with the SEC. 80 The SEC also imposes restrictions on
offers to buy an unregistered security. 8 The crux of these restrictions is
found in the definitions of "offer" 82 and "offer to buy" 83 as applied to the
Acts. The practical result is that although a domestic individual or small
institutional investor 84 may find a unregistered foreign securities investment
opportunity through his own efforts, such as Web-browsing or direct
contacting the issuer, the issuer's acceptance of this offer to buy is a
violation of current securities regulations.
A viable option would be to allow foreign securities issuers to advertise
in the United States but require their advertisements to clearly and
conspicuously state that the offered security is not governed or protected by
the SEC. These securities would not be listed on U.S. exchanges and would
be altogether separate from the registered listings. Exposure to U.S. investors
would come in the form of conventional advertising. Requiring disclaimers
on the advertisements would still comport with Congress' goal of caveat
emptor in securities trading. 6 Additionally, this method would not affect
the integrity of, or investor confidence in, the U.S. exchanges because these
advertised securities would not be affiliated in any way with the exchanges.
If Congress feels that allowing full-blown advertising of unregistered

80. 15 U.S.C. § 77e; see also supra text accompanying notes 10-31 (discussing
registration requirements).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
82. Id. § 77b (3) (stating that "[tihe term[s] 'offer to sell', 'offer for sale', or 'offer' shall
include every attempt to offer to dispose of... a security or interest in a security, for value").
83. Id. This section also states that "[t]he terms defined in this paragraph and the term
'offer to buy' ... shall not include preliminary negotiations or agreements between an issuer
...and any underwriter or among underwriters who are or are to be in privity of contract
with an issuer." Id. This effectively includes in the restriction all negotiations by individual
investors or institutional buyers who do not meet the definition of a qualified institutional
buyer" in Rule 144A. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a).
84. "Small institutional investor" means those institutional investors who are not covered
under the definition of a qualified institutional buyer under Rule 144A. See id.
85. For a website example, see LipperAnalytical: The Analytical Standard(visited July
20, 1998) <http:\\www.lipperweb.com>. Regarding the direct calling of an offshore fund,
when an individual U.S. investor placed a call to the Jardine Fleming Group in London to
inquire about their "Jardine Fleming Unit China Trust," the inquiry was met with questioning
about whether or not the caller was a U.S. investor. The issuer told the investor, "I am not
allowed to talk to you about that fund because it is not registered with the SEC and any
further discussion would be a violation of SEC regulations." This is a common response
given to individual investor attempting to purchase unregistered foreign mutual funds.
86. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 171 (stating that Congress' intended purpose with
securities regulation has shifted from one of full disclosure to one of caveat emptor - let the
buyer beware).
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485

foreign securities to the unsuspecting public would be too drastic, it could
start by allowing investor-initiated contact as a means of greater access to
tan
this approach, more foreign
foreign unregistered securities. 87 By taking
investment opportunities would become available for sophisticated investors
who seek them out, regardless of their size, yet the unsuspecting public
would not be barraged with pitches for unregulated securities. If sophisticated investors feel it the risk in trading in unprotected investments is too
great,88 they simply would not purchase the security. Instead, they would
wait until more disclosure or information became available, or until the rate
of return outweighed the risk. 89 In effect, market forces would establish the
degree of disclosure necessary for each security, as opposed to the SEC
setting arbitrary numbers and restriction. 9° The end result would be that all
U.S. investors, including individuals and small institutions, would collectively
decide what foreign securities to purchase, instead of being limited by the
SEC and the purchasing decisions of the qualified institutional buyers. 9'
Furthermore, foreign issuers who are not big enough to meet the minimum
float thresholds, or those that are not popular enough to be purchased by
large institutional buyers, would enjoy greater access to U.S. investor capital,
capital to which they might not otherwise have access in their home
country. 92

87. This is somewhat allowed with the current regulation under Rule 144A, but only if
the buyer is a qualified institutional buyer, which basically means a large institutional buyer.
17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a) (stating that the entity must own or invest on a discretionary basis
at least US$100 million in securities of issuers not affiliated with the entity in order to be a
qualified institutional investor).
88. "Unprotected investment" means that lack of protection from the SEC is factored into
an investor's decision of whether or not to purchase a security, presumably making the
investment a greater risk and thus requiring greater return to justify the investors purchase.
See Cox, supra note 55, at 159-60.
89. Id. (explaining the basic economic tenet that if someone wants more of anything, here
information, they will wait until more is provided or the price is lowered).
90. Factored into an investor's decision, and collectively affecting the equilibrium level
of disclosure, is the securities regulation of the issuer's home country. See id.; see also supra
text accompanying notes 49-74.
91. Interview with global investment analysts, Porter Stansberry and Steve Sjuggerud,
Welt Research (now Fleet Street), Delray Beach, Fla. One school of thought among global
investment analysts is that the current legislative scheme allows U.S.-owned global mutual
funds and ADR brokers to decide which foreign securities to buy, thereby cornering the
market on global securities in the United States and the profitable transaction costs associated
with managing such securities for U.S. investors. Id. This same school of thought maintains
that the stronghold of the status quo is due to the powerful securities lobby. Id. While
theories behind the strength of the status quo are appropriate considerations in this analysis,
they are beyond the scope of this comment.
92. The "type" of capital referred to is capital that is highly liquid and of which there is
a relatively large volume.
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CONCLUSION

Deregulation of the U.S. securities exchanges through lowering or
eliminating registration requirements would violate the integrity of the U.S.
markets by weakening investor confidence, and thereby would raise the cost
of capital. However, maintaining the current broad definition of "offer" to
mean any solicitation and including "offer to buy" in these restrictions
unnecessarily precludes U.S. investors from having a full spectrum of
investment choices. Further, the current regulation that disallows offers to
sell or buy unregistered securities creates an artificial equilibrium in the
global securities market, which will eventually weaken the U.S. market as
investors and issuers look to other markets to satisfy there capital needs.
Congress should allow the marketing of unregistered securities with the
inclusion of conspicuous disclaimers, or in the alternative, should allow U.S.
investors to initiate contact with issuers of foreign unregistered securities.
This would give the U.S. investor more choice about where to invest and
would give smaller foreign issuers greater access to liquid capital, ultimately
resulting in long-term benefits for the global economy. Even so, this change
would not violate Congress' intended caveat emptor approach to securities
regulations. While this solution for dealing with the quickly globalizing
securities market is not a permanent one, it would prevent U.S. investors, and
subsequently the U.S. economy, from failing to profit in today's quickly
changing world economy.
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